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LOCKS & LEVIES
JEREMY F. DEBEERt
ABSTRACT

This paper explores two ways that law can influence the creation and
distribution of digital content. Specifically, it looks at the relationship
between (1) prohibitionsagainst circumventing technologicalprotection
measures (TPMs) and (2) levies on products or services used to reproduce or transmit digital materials. The relationship between digital
locks and levies is analyzed through a comparative study of developments in Canadaand the United States.
Canada has created a broad levy (compared to the United States) to address the issue of private copying. Canada has not, so far, enacted specific anti-circumvention legislation like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The United States, on the other hand, has enacted, in
the DMCA, relatively strong prohibitionsagainst circumventing TPMs.
At the same time, a very narrow levy exists in the United States under the
Audio Home RecordingAct (AHRA). In short, the legal situation in Canada is basically the inverse of that in the United States. However, there
have been proposals in the United States to expand the role of levies.
There have also been proposals to introduce anti-circumventionprovisions in Canada.
In this paper, alternative approachesare examinedfrom the perspective
of various stakeholders--creators, technology firms and consumers.
Different types of copyright-holders generally prefer different approaches. Individual authors and performers and their representative
societies have favorable attitudes towards levies, while major producers
and distributors tend to prefer the control digital locks provide. Technology firms and communications intermediaries might be affected by
both locks and levies, but are typically against expansive levy schemes.
When considering the costs and benefits of locks or levies to consumers,
it is important to distinguish between consumers of entertainment and
consumers of electronics, who are impacted differently.
Because these stakeholders hold different preferences, compromises are
likely to be made in Canada and the United States. If locks and levies
are used simultaneously in the market, consumers risk being caught in
t
Jeremy deBeer, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law
Section. Thanks to the University of Ottawa and the Law Foundation of Ontario for funding to
support this research, to Adrienne Moir for her invaluable research assistance, to participants at the
Summit on Intellectual Property & Digital Media for their feedback on my work and to The Cable
Center and the University of Denver for the invitation to be involved.

144

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

the middle of a regime that prohibits the circumvention of digital rights
management (DRM) systems in order to access or copy digital content,
but at the same time mandates levy payments to compensatefor copying
that either cannot occur, is already licensed, or is or should be fair dealing/use. Without careful study, lawmakers in either country could accidentally create a scheme including conceptually and practically incompatible legal regulations. An overview of various stakeholders' experiences in Canada, the United States and Europe provides valuable insightsfor North American law andpolicy makers.
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As consumers continue to embrace new technologies for listening to
and sharing music, movies and other forms of entertainment, content
creators and distributors must adapt to the rapidly evolving business environment. There is no need to rehash modem technological, economic
and cultural challenges in great detail. By now, everyone reading this
paper is aware that tens of millions of people use peer-to-peer distribution networks to share music, movies and other digital content. Entertainment industry incumbents are threatened by this activity. There are
several possible responses.
One is to use digital locks to control access to or use of digital content. Where legal protections are perceived to be inadequate, firms use
technological protection measures (TPMs) to control what consumers are
and are not able to do with entertainment products. TPMs are a key
component of many digital rights management (DRM) strategies. Because digital locks can be picked, content owners have successfully lobbied international and some domestic lawmakers for specific legal prohibitions against circumventing TPMs.
Another response is to employ levies that generate revenues to incentivize content creation. Creators sacrifice a degree of control over
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their works in exchange for remuneration intended to compensate for
private or non-commercial copying. This approach is similar to compulsory licensing, except that licence fees are paid not by users of copyrighted materials, but by manufacturers or providers of certain goods or
services.
There is an abundance of scholarship exploring TPMs and anticircumvention provisions. There is also a growing body of literature
discussing theoretical alternative compensation models. My goal is to
juxtapose these issues by looking at recent real-world developments in
Canada and the United States, and to some extent, Europe. I want to explore a worldwide trend toward the simultaneous presence of both locks
and levies in digital entertainment markets.
Canada and the United States have much in common. In addition to
sharing a border nearly 9000 kilometres long, there are remarkable economic, cultural and technological similarities between the two countries.
Cultural industries are an important part of the economy in both Canada1
and the United States.2 Perhaps more importantly, consumers in both
jurisdictions share similar tastes for entertainment products. Although
Americans import less Canadian music than visa versa, a substantial
number of Canadian artists are popular south of the border, demonstrating consumers' shared preferences. Canadians and Americans have access to much of the same technology for listening to and sharing music,
movies, video games and other entertainment products. Both countries
have above-average levels of broadband internet access. 3 Since the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadians and
Americans find themselves in an increasingly similar technological, cultural and economic environment.
Despite these similarities, North America is not yet as tightly integrated as, for instance, the European Union. There are important differences between Canada and the United States, from distinct regulatory
regimes to particular political preferences. There are also rather different
legal climates affecting the creation and distribution of digital entertainment products. In particular, these two countries have created distinct
1. In Canada, copyright-based industries account for 9.3% of the 2005 GDP. Copyrightbased industries include the following three sectors as measured by Statistics Canada: information
and cultural; professional, scientific, and technical; and arts, entertainment, and recreation. See
Statistics Canada, http://www.statcan.ca/101/cst0l/econ4l.htm?sdi=gross%20domestic%20product
%20all%20industries.
2.
In the United States, the figure was a comparable 12.4% for 2005. Copyright-based industries include the following three sectors as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis: information; professional, scientific and technical services; and arts, entertainment and recreation. See Thomas F. Howells Ill and Kevin B. Barefoot, Annual Industry Accounts: Advance Estimatesfor 2005 at
18, (May 2006), http://www.bea.gov/bea/ARTlCLES/2006/05May/0506_lndyAccts.pdf.
3. Although broadband penetration in 2004 was slightly higher in Canada (17%) than it was
in the U.S. (13%), both countries are above the 10% average for OECD countries. See Dr. Sacha
Wunsch-Vincent and Dr. Graham Vickery, Working Party on the Information Economy - Digital
BroadbandContent: Music at 85 (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/34995041 .pdf.
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legal rules for creators and online entrepreneurs by, so far, adopting different policies on the issues of locks and levies.
In Part One of this paper, I explain that in Canada there is a relatively broad levy to compensate for private copying. There are not yet
specific Canadian anti-circumvention provisions, although TPMs are
apparently utilized nonetheless extensively. In Part Two, I look at the
American situation, which is nearly the exact inverse. In the United
States, there is a relatively narrow levy to deal with audio home recording, while there are fairly broad anti-circumvention provisions.
However, there has been pressure to enact anti-circumvention provisions
in Canada, and there have been numerous proposals to adopt a broader
levy scheme in the United States.
Part Three of this paper explores some of the consequences of
locks, levies and proposals for change, from the perspective of creators
and distributors, technology firms and intermediaries and consumers of
electronics and digital content. Locks and levies affect each of these
stakeholders differently. In Part Four, I conclude that the diversity of
perspectives between and within interested stakeholder groups is likely
to lead to compromise solutions, combining aspects of multiple approaches. It is possible, therefore, that policymakers in Canada and/or
the United States will create a system involving both locks and levies.
This is problematic. Consumers risk being caught in the middle of a
regime that prohibits the circumvention of DRM systems in order to access or copy digital content, but at the same time mandates levy payments to compensate for copying that either cannot occur, is already licensed or constitutes fair use/dealing. This has already happened in
Europe, nearly happened in Canada and could easily occur in the United
States. Policymakers should be aware of these concerns in order to
minimize incompatibilities within a system that simultaneously incorporates both locks and levies.
I. CANADA
Canadian copyright law includes an exemption/levy scheme to address the private copying of music. The law also allows for the use of
TPMs, which many content creators and distributors successfully utilize
in Canada. At present, however, the Copyright Act does not directly
prohibit the circumvention of TPMs. The following section describes
these various aspects of Canadian copyright law in more detail.
A. The PrivateCopying Levy
In Canada, after more than a decade of lobbying, the music industry
convinced Parliament that private copying onto blank tapes was causing
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significant losses.4 So, in 1998, Part VIII was added to the Copyright
Act to legalize private copying onto some types of blank media, and as a
corollary to allow certain authors, performers and sound recording makers to propose to the Copyright Board a levy payable by manufacturers
and importers of those media.5 In short, the regime substitutes exclusive
copyrights with a unique right to collect remuneration from third parties.
The object of Canada's private copying levy was to provide compensation to certain music creators, whose exclusive copyrights were
believed to be practically unenforceable at the time the regime was enacted. According to Linden J.A., in A VS Technologies: "The purpose of
Part VIII of the Act is mainly an economic one - that is, to fairly compensate artists and the other creative people for their work by establishing fair and equitable levies."6 Although the rationale that private copying cannot be mostly addressed by legal or technological means is no
longer applicable,7 a levy does still alleviate problems with allowing8
copyright owners to monitor and control people's private activities.
There are misunderstandings and disagreements, however, about exactly
what sort of private copying the Canadian levy scheme covers.
According to transcripts of meetings preceding the enactment of the
levy, the matter to be addressed was actually quite specific-the use of

4.
According to then Minister of Canadian Heritage, Sheila Copps, a majority of the 44
million blank tapes sold in Canada in 1994 were used to copy music. See A Study of Bill C-32, An
Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Shelia Copps, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minster of
Canadian Heritage), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/
21_96-10-03/heri-21-cover-e.html. See also Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry,
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pades-srdp/pubs/f-sum-e.htm; Government
of Canada, Parliamentary Sub-committee on the Revision of Copyright, Charterof Rights for Creators (1985) [hereinafter Charter].
5. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, §§ 80, 82; Jeremy F. deBeer, The Role of
Levies in Canada's Digital Music Market, 4:3 CAN. J.L. TECH. 153 (2005); Jeremy F. deBeer,
Copyrights, Federalism and the Constitutionality of Canada's Private Copying Levy, 51 MCGILL
L.J. (forthcoming 2006); Copyright Board of Canada, Private Copying 1999-2000, at 32-39 (Dec.
17, 1999), available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c 17121999-b.pdf [hereinafter Copyright
Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000]; Copyright Board of Canada, Private Copying 2001-2002,
at 3-4 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c22012001reasons-b.pdf
[hereinafter Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2001-2002]; Copyright Board of Canada, Private Copying 2003-2004, at 2 (Dec.
12, 2003), available at http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf [hereinafter Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 20032004]; Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance, [2004] F.C.A.
424, 3 [hereinafter CPCCv. CSMA].
6. AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency, 7 C.P.R.
(4th) 68, 5 (2000) [hereinafter A VS Technologies].
7.
See P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Future of Levies in a DigitalEnvironment, at 42,
(March 2003), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&Ievies-report.pdf.
8.
See Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principleor Compromise?: Understandingthe
Original Thinking Behind Statutory Licence and Levy Schemes for Private Copying, at 6-10 (May
2004), http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/2004/lPRIA%2
WP%20
04.04.pdf.
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blank tapes to copy music for private use. 9 Although blank CDs and
other digital technologies were envisioned at the time, they were not in
1997 the matter of immediate concern. The "jukebox or record store in
the sky" was foreseen, but recording industry lobbyists stressed that a
levy could not replace the revenues that might be generated by a market
for digital downloads.' °
On the other hand, the Copyright Act defines media subject to the
levy in a way that could hardly be more broadly drafted. The breadth of
Canada's levy turns on the definition of an "audio recording medium" in
section 79.11 It is legal to copy privately using "a recording medium,
regardless of its material form, onto which a sound recording may be
reproduced and that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers
for that purpose."' 2 Certain rights-holders may propose a levy payable
by manufacturers and/or importers of the same.13
After its first hearings on the matter, the Copyright Board adopted a
flexible and relaxed interpretation of "ordinarily used" in order to ensure
that blank CDs, a relatively new technology at the time, would be captured.' 4 It held the standard to mean that media are leviable so long as
their use for copying music is "non-negligible."' 15 In effect, according to
the Board, ordinarily means not extraordinarily. The Federal Court of
Appeal affirmed that this view was "not patently unreasonable" but
16
stopped short of holding that the Board's interpretation was correct.
Such a low threshold makes Canada's levy much broader than the
American scheme to deal with home audio recording, which captures
only products that have a "primary purpose" of recording digital audio. 17
Another key phrase in section 79 is "regardless of its material
form." A strong argument can be made that this clause shows an intention to make the levy as technology-neutral as possible. Some government reports predating the levy support such an interpretation. 8 Following its third hearings on private copying, the Copyright Board interpreted
9.
A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Committee
on
Canadian
Heritage,
35th
Parliament
(Oct.
3,
1996),
available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/21_96-10-03/heri-2 1-cover-e.html.
10.
See A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing
Committee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Oct. 22, 1996), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/26_96-10-22/heri-26-cover-e.html;
A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Nov. 7, 1996), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/37 96-11-07/heri-37-cover-e.html.
11.
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 79.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at § 81.
14.
Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supranote 5, at 28-32.
15.
Id. at32.
16.
A VS Technologies, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 68,
9-13; see also BLAIS ET AL., STANDARDS OF
REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 141-42 (2d ed. 2005).

17.

See infra Part lI.B. (discussing the Audio Home Recording Act).

18.

Charter,supra note 4.
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the definition broadly to include digital audio recorders, such as the Apple iPod.19 The Federal Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Board's
decision on this point. The Court of Appeal held that memory is not a
leviable medium if it is embedded into a device. 20 The Court felt the
decision to extend the levy to iPods was for the legislator, not the Board
or the courts, to make. 2' Because Canada's levy excludes devices, it is
not as broad as some European schemes.22 In theory, it is also unlike the
American Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in this respect, although
in practice that is a minor point of distinction.23
One interpretation of the Court's decision leaves open the possibility that removable digital memory, or a computer hard drive that has not
yet been incorporated into a device, could be subject to a levy in the future. It may, however, be splitting hairs to call an iPod a device and removable or raw digital memory a medium. More importantly such a
medium may not be in a form "ordinarily used" by individuals to copy
music. In fact, the Copyright Board expressly held that products such as
IBM MicroDrive hard drives or CompactFlash digital memory cards are
overwhelmingly24 used for digital photography or other applications, not
copying music.
As a corollary to the liabilities imposed on manufacturers and importers of blank audio recording media, consumers are exempted under
section 80 of the Copyright Act from liability for private copying using
such media.25 The private copying exemption only applies to a narrow
genre of truly private copying onto certain types of media. The copy
must be made "for the private use of the person making the copy ' 26making a copy for a friend or family member is not permitted within the
scope of this exception.2 7
However, Canadian courts and administrative decision-makers have
downplayed the nexus between an approved tariff, actual levy payments
and the legality of private copying. The Copyright Board of Canada has
stated that "simply because the Board has not been asked to certify a
tariff on hard disks in personal computers, it does not follow that private
copies made onto such media infringe copyright., 28 Thus, some private
copying activities might be legal under Part VIII of Canada's Copyright

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Copyright Bd. of Can., PrivateCopying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 10, 38.
CPCCv. CSM, F.C.A. 424, In 153-164 (2004).
Id.
See Hugenholtz, supranote 7, at 13.
See infra Part 11.B. (discussing the Audio Home Recording Act).
Copyright Bd. of Can., PrivateCopying 2003-2004, supranote 5, at 44, 46-47.
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 80.
Id.
Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 20.
Id. at21.
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Act, 29 despite the fact that the relevant media/devices are not actually the
subject of a proposed or effective tariff.
This has led some to believe that Canada's private copying regime
legalizes downloading from peer-to-peer (p2 p) networks onto hard drives
in personal computers. 30 A careful analysis reveals that is not likely true.
The Copyright Board did lay down series of propositions that, if correct,
could have led to the conclusion that downloading is legal in Canada: a)
electronic and hard disk memory is leviable just as 'traditional' media
like CDs and cassettes; 3' b) hard disk memory in personal computers is
technically identical to other hard disk memory; 32 c) the "legitimacy" of
an activity such as private copying depends not on the presence of a tariff
on a particular kind or unit of a medium, but on whether the kind of medium is ordinarily used by individual consumers to copy music;

33

and d)

personal computers are being widely used by individual consumers to
copy music. 34 Because the Copyright Board had held that "digital audio

recorders" (e.g. iPods) were a kind of "audio recording medium" subject
to a levy, and iPods are technically indistinguishable from hard drives in
personal computers,35 an inference could have been drawn that it is legal
to make private copies using personal computers.
Justice Von Finckenstein embraced this reasoning in his decision in
BMG Canada v. Doe36 to dismiss an interim motion brought as part of
the Canadian recording industry's lawsuits against individual peer-topeer network users, alleged to be copyright infringers.37 However, in its
judicial review of the Copyright Board's decision, the Federal Court of
Appeal subsequently overruled the first of the Board's key propositions
that could have rendered downloading legal.38 As mentioned, the Court
of Appeal overruled the iPod levy because it held that memory embedded in a device is not an audio recording medium. 39 The corollary is that
private copying using iPods is not permitted (at least not under section
80), and inferentially, private copying using hard drives in personal computers is not permitted. Therefore, in the words of the Court of Appeal,
"copyright infringement could result from the use of such devices to private copy. '4° Meanwhile, all of Justice Von Finckenstein's findings re-

29.
30.
31.

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, §§ 79-88.
E.g., BMG Can. Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 9 25, vacated, [2005] F.C.A. 193.
See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supranote 5, at 2.

32.
33.

Id.at44.
Id.at 46.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.at 38-39.
[2004] F.C.J. No. 525, vacated, [2005] F.C.A. 193.
BMG Can. Inc., [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 25.
CPCC v. CSMA, [2004] F.C.A. 424, 99 153-164.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 1147 (emphasis added).
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garding the state of Canadian copyright law
were vacated by the Federal
4
Court of Appeal in BMG Canada v. Doe. 1
In short, the legality of downloading in Canada depends on whether
hard drives in personal computers are an "audio recording medium" according to the statutory definition. The Federal Court of Appeal's ruling
in respect of digital audio recorders such as iPods implies that they are
not.
The revenues generated by the levy are nevertheless substantial.
The Canadian levy currently generates roughly $30-35 million per year
for rights-holders. Total Canadian levy revenues collected since 2000
have reached over $162 million (Canadian).4 a That may not seem like
much, but extrapolated on a per capita basis and accounting for currency
exchange rates, this would be roughly the equivalent of $1 billion (U.S.),
or $250 million (U.S.) per annum. 44 Remember, the figures account only
for the value of private copying onto blank CDs, audiotapes and minidiscs, and do not include compensation for p2p file sharing. In that light,
Canada's levy generates a lot of money.
The Government has identified Canada's private copying regime as
a timely issue, and has committed to engage in study and public consultations on the matter. 45 Among the most pressing questions will be
whether, and if so how, the scheme should apply in the digital age. One
possibility is to expand Canada's private copying levy to encompass
iPods and similar digital music devices, solid-state removable digital
memory products like CompactFlash cards, hard disc drives in desktop
and laptop computers, and/or mobile phones, personal digital assistants
and other convergence devices onto which music may be copied. Another possibility is to narrow or eliminate the levy altogether, instead
promoting a combination of locks, licenses and litigation to control Ca-

41.
BMG Can. Inc., [2005] F.C.A. 193,
47-52.
42. Canadian Private Copying Collective, Financial Highlights, http://cpcc.ca/english/fin
Highlights.htm.
43.
Id. (on average, the Canadian levy has generated approximately $27 million (Canadian) a
year in revenue, with royalty collections increasing dramatically over recent years).
44.
The population of Canada was 32,270,500 in 2005.
Statistics Canada,
http://www40.statcan.ca/l0l/cstOl/demoO2.htm. In 2005, the U.S. population was 297,599,080. U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Monthly
National
Population
Estimates,
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/NA-EST2004-0 .html. In order to arrive at $1 billion (U.S.),
I applied the ratio of Canada to U.S. population to the $162 million (Canadian) in levy revenues.
Then, I adjusted the product for an average exchange rate of 0.70436771 between January 2000 and
December 2005 as calculated by the
Bank of Canada.
Bank
of Canada,
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/exchange-avg.html.
45.
Government of Canada, Supporting CultureandInnovation: Report on the Provisionsand
Operation of the Copyright Act 2 (2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemetfincrpprda.nsf/en/rp00863e.html; Government of Canada, Government Statement on Proposalsfor Copyright Reform, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/reforn/statemente.cfm.
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nadians' music copying practices. At the present time, however, both the
scope of the levy and the levy rate appear to have stabilized.46
B. DigitalRights Management Systems
Canada has not yet included prohibitions against circumventing
digital rights management (DRM) systems in its copyright legislation.
Regardless, DRM systems are used widely in Canada for distributing
music and other digital content. The following section examines more
closely the sorts of copy-controls that are presently used in Canada.
In 2002, Professor Kerr and a team of co-authors prepared a twopart report for the Department of Canadian Heritage on the subject of
technological protection measures (TPMs).47 In Part I, among other
things, they describe various types of DRM systems, including TPMs.
TPMs include access-control measures, such as cryptography,
where access to content is restricted in one way or another.48 One of the
most widely known TPMs they discuss is the Content Scramble System
(CSS), which controls playback and recording of DVDs. 49 Simply put,

most DVDs are region-coded to, among other things, limit unlicensed
geographic redistribution of films. 5 0 For example, consumers who law-

fully purchase a DVD in Europe may be frustrated to discover it will not
play on their North American DVD player.
Other TPMs control not access to, but use of digital content.5 Kerr
and his co-authors describe Macrovision, the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) and other "copy-control" TPMs that allow a rights-holder to
control copying, transmission and other uses of a work. 5 2 Another example of a widely used DRM tool is Adobe Systems PDF file format.
Real Networks, Microsoft and Apple all use DRM systems, including
TPMs, in one form or another to manage the distribution and playback of
audio and/or multimedia files.
The Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) is a particularly interesting TPM given its connection with the Audio Home Recording

46.
The Board has approved substantially the same private copying tariff for the past several
years. See Copyright Bd. of Can., http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs/certified/copying-e.html.
lan Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Part I 47.
Trends in Technical Protection Measures and Circumvention Technologies (2002),
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/protection/protectione.pdf [hereinafter Kerr
et al., TPMs: Part/]; Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Part II - The Legal Protection of TPMs (2002), http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pdacpb/pubs/protectionlI/protection-e.pdf [hereinafter Kerr et al., TPMs: Part11].
48.
Kerr et al., TPMs: PartI, supra note 47, at 2.
Id. at 9.
49.
50.
Id.
Id. at 19.
51.
Id. at 9, 15.
52.
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Act 53

in the United States, discussed below. 54 This technology, with the
aid of a digitally encoded watermark, allows unlimited copying from
original recordings but not from second-generation copies. It prevents
serial copying.55
TPMs recently made headlines in Canada (and the United States) in
connection with their use by Sony BMG Music on CDs. 56 Tens of millions of discs included software that was designed to control consumers'
uses of music, but which in fact installed on their computers a "rootkit"
or another program that interfered with normal system operations, caused
serious security vulnerabilities, was practically impossible to uninstall
and surreptitiously reported information about users' computers and listening activities.57 Numerous lawsuits were commenced in response to
Sony BMG's actions. In the United States, the private actions were consolidated and settled, although there are still individual and governmentled complaints or investigations pending. 58 Parallel class actions in Canada are also ongoing. 9
For law and policy makers, and for consumers, these lawsuits are a
clear reminder that TPMs are prevalent in the Canadian digital marketplace. In fact, all or most of the aforementioned DRM systems are apparently used as extensively and effectively in Canada as they are in
other jurisdictions, despite the lack of circumvention prohibitions in the
Canadian Copyright Act.

53.
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2006)).
54.
See infra Part lI.B.
55.
Kerr et al., TPMs: Part 1, supra note 47, at 13; see also Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio
Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311,325 (1994).

56. See Jeremy F. deBeer, How Restrictive Terms and Technologies Backfired on Sony BMG
Music (Part 1), 6 INTERNET & E-CoM. L. IN CAN. 93 (2006); Jeremy F. deBeer, How Restrictive
Terms and Technologies Backfired on Sony BMG Music (Part 2), 7 INTERNET & E-COM. L. IN CAN.
1 (2006); Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode,
http://itpolicy.cs.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm.pdf.
57. Furthermore, consumers who had purchased one of these CDs could not use it on a computer without clicking to agree with misleading, not to mention ridiculous, terms and conditions. See
Halderman & Felten, supra note 56.
58.
See In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litigation, Case No 1:05-cv-09575, (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Complaint, Mark Lyon v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, County Court of Hinds County, Mississippi,
First Judicial District (Jan. 5, 2006) (consolidated into In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litigation); see
also Texas v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, Dist. Ct., Travis Co, Texas; Office of the Attorney General
of Florida, Case No. L05-3-1157; Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG's Case,
BUSINESSWEEK,
Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/nov2005/tc20051128 573560.htm.
59. Jacques v. Sony, 06-044 S.C.B.C. (2006); Cheneyl v. Sony, 06-CV-033329 Ont. Sup. Ct.
Jus. (2006); Palmer. v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 06-CV-304178CP Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus. (2006).
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C. ParacopyrightProposals
Because prohibitions on the circumvention of DRM systems offer
legal protection beyond that provided by traditional copyright law, they

are sometimes referred to as "paracopyright" laws.60
Provisions addressing the circumvention of TPMs and tampering

with rights management information (RMI) had their genesis in the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty

(WCT)6 ! and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT).62 These are collectively known as the WIPO Internet Treaties.
Article 11 of the WCT requires that:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty or the Beme Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which
are not authorized by the
63
authors concerned or permitted by law.

Because "adequate legal protection" can be provided through diverse areas of law,64 it would be inaccurate to suggest that Canadian law
does not contain any anti-circumvention laws. But the government's
own studies have concluded that "[a]t the moment, it is far from certain
that new legislation designed to protect the legitimate use of TPMs is
necessary to meet the TPM-related requirements of the WCT and
WPPT. 6 5 Although Canadian law does not include specific prohibitions
against circumventing TPMs, like the DMCA does, Canada's Copyright

60. See, e.g., Jeremy F. deBeer, ConstitutionalJurisdiction Over ParacopyrightLaws, in IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 89, 89-90 (Michael Geist ed.,
2005) (citing David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
SOc'Y U.S.A. 401, 405 (1998-1999)); Michael J. Remington, The Ever-Whirling Cycle of Change:
Copyright and Cyberspace, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 213, 238-41 (2002); Dan L. Burk, AntiCircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2003); Kimberlee Weatherall, Before the
High Court: On Technology Locks and the ProperScope of Digital Copyright Laws - Sony in the
High Court, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 613, 615 (2004). Peter Jaszi has also used the terms "pseudocopyright" and "metacopyright" to describe similarly new rights. See Peter Jaszi, Professor, Is This the
End of Copyright As We Know It?, Address at Nordinfo Conference in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 910, 1997), at 58-67.
61.
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11-12, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M.
65
[hereinafter
WCT],
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wctl
pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf.
62.
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograph Treaty art. 18-19,
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
wppt/pdf/trtdocs-wo034.pdf
63.
WCT, supra note 61, at 71; WPPT art. 18, supra note 62, at 86 (using similar language in
respect of the rights of performers and record producers).
64.
deBeer, supranote 60, at 94-95.
65.
Kerr et al., TPMs: Part11, supra note 47, § 8.0; see also Ian R. Kerr, Alana Maunrushat &
Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L.
REV. 7, 76-77 (2002-2003).
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Act provides some protection. 66 Specifically, TPMs involving computer
programs may be protected as literary works. Canada's Criminal Code
also protects TPMs in various ways.67

Nevertheless, there has been pressure on Canada to strengthen its
laws in this respect. Canada was even on the Special 301 Watch List
maintained by the Office of the United States Trade Representative.68
In May 2004, the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage recommended immediate ratification of the WCT and WPPT. 69 To accomplish this, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-60 in the summer
of 2005.70 Bill C-60 would have prohibited the act of circumvention, or
the provision of services to circumvent, but only if it were "for the purpose of an act that is an infringement of the copyright." 71 This legislation never made it past its first reading in the House of Commons. The
minority government that introduced the Bill was defeated on a vote of
non-confidence (over issues unrelated to copyright reform) before Bill C60 made it to committee review.
As a result, Canadian law and policy makers went back to the drawing board. Just when it seemed the new government was picking up
where the old one left off,72 important stakeholders publicly expressed
disapproval of the expected reforms.7 3 Canada, it seems, is back to
square one on the issue of prohibitions against the circumvention of
DRM systems.
II. UNITED STATES
74
The United States' Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
includes strong prohibitions against circumventing TPMs and/or devices
that facilitate circumvention. There is a relatively narrow levy on very

66. See Christian S. Tacit & Nelligan O'Brien Payne, The Current Status of Legal Protection
for Technology Protection Measures in Canada § 3.2 (2003), available at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/uridique/indexe.cfm.
67. Id. at §§ 3.3, 3.4.
68.
Special
301
Watch
List
(2003),
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
Reports Publications/2003/2003_Special 301 Report/Special_301 WatchList.html?ht -=.
69. Parliament of Canada, Interim Report on Copyright Reform: Report of the Standing
Committee on Canadian Heritage, (Ottawa: Communication Canada, May 2004).
http://www.parl.gc.ca/nfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/herirpO I-e.htm
[hereinafter Interim Report].
70. Bill C-60, Parliament of Canada (2005) (First Reading), http://www.parl.gc.ca/
38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/1 19_2005-06-20/tocl 19-E.htm (scroll down the schedule index
to the "1510" time and click on the "Copyright Act" hyperlink).
71.
Id. at § 34.02(1), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/38/l/parlbus/chambus/
house/bills/government/C-60 1.PDF.
72. See Conservative Government to Introduce Copyright Bill: Bev Oda, THE HILL TIMES
(Ottawa, ON), Apr. 10, 2006, Politics Page, available at http://www.thehilltimes.ca/html/
index.php?display=story&full_path=/2006/april/10/politics/&c=1.
73.
See, e.g., Canadian Music Creators Coalition, http://www.musiccreators.ca; Intellectual
Privacy, http://www.intellectualprivacy.ca; Appropriation Art, http://www.appropriationart.ca.
74.
17 U.S.C.A. §§1201-1205, 1301-1332 (West 2006).
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limited types of products established under the AHRA. Several commentators have, however, suggested expanding the role of levies in the
United States. The following section explores these topics in more detail.
A. The DigitalMillennium Copyright Act
American lawmakers were early adopters of the WIPO Internet
Treaties' anti-circumvention provisions. In 1998, the DMCA 75 was
adopted into law, marking perhaps the most significant amendment to the
Copyright Act of 1976 to date.76
The DMCA prohibits acts of circumvention. 77 Recall that the Canadian proposal would have prohibited circumvention only if done for
the purpose of facilitating copyright infringement. The DMCA instead
enumerates several specific exceptions. The United States Copyright
Office conducts triennial reviews of these exceptions, and has certain
rulemaking powers in this respect. 78 These reviews have allowed for
certain exceptions, 79 but they are rather narrow and obscure. American
courts have not been willing to expand or broadly interpret the list of
enumerated exceptions .8 0 For instance, circumvention for fair use has
not been permitted.
In addition to prohibiting circumvention of TPMs, the DMCA also
prevents trafficking in technologies designed to circumvent encryption
measures. 8 1 It is largely for this reason that the DMCA has led to heavy

75.

17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(1).

76.

See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37 (2001).

77.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1201.
78.
Exemptions are granted for a period of three years with the possibility of extensions after
the following triennial review. See generally Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A
Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings (2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=844544. To date, two triennial reviews have
been completed by the U.S. Copyright Office: one in 2000 and the second in 2003. For information
on the classes of exemptions requested by the public during the third triennial review currently under
way, please see Comments on Anticircumvention Exemptions (2006) http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2006/comments/index.html.
79.
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights (2003), http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2003/index.html.
80.
See, e.g., 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcomsoft, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
81.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l).
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criticism from many commentators.8 2 Several United States cases illustrate the breadth of the DMCA's possible effects.83
In some contexts, the threat of liability under the DMCA has lead to
self-censorship by technology researchers. 84 Professor Felten of Princeton University, his research team, employer and organizers of an academic conference were formally threatened with legal consequences if
findings regarding vulnerabilities with the Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SMDI) copy protection scheme would have been presented.85 The following year, Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian programmer, was actually arrested and prosecuted (although not convicted) in the United States for
working on a program that may have86 been used to circumvent technological restrictions in Adobe e-books.
In other contexts, the DMCA has had anti-competitive effects. In
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,87 the
plaintiff used the DMCA to prevent the production of aftermarket toner
cartridges.8 8 Similarly, in Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies,89
the plaintiff attempted to use the DMCA to impede the production of
universal garage door openers by one of its competitors. 90 Even though
the defendants in both cases were ultimately successful, 9' their legal victories were not without costly litigation.
The DMCA has, of course, stifled technologies used to circumvent
copyright-related TPMs. In 2000, major movie studios stopped a magazine from posting the code to circumvent access and copy controls on
DVDs, and from knowingly linking to websites where the code was
available.92 Also in 2000, RealNetworks employed the DMCA to obtain
an injunction against Streambox, designers of a digital VCR that allowed

82.

See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the

Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 520, 527 (1999);

Burk, supra note 60; Simon Fitzpatrick, Copyright Imbalances: U.S. and Australian Responses to
the WIPO Digital Copyright Treaty, 5 E.I.P.R. 214, 223 (2000); Kamiel J. Koelman, Address at the
ALAI Congress: The Protection of Technological Measures vs. the Copyright Limitations (June
2001), http://www.alai-usa.org/200I_conference/lprogram en.htm (scroll down to "Subpart 2"and
click on the "text" link next to author's name to download document).
83.
For more DMCA casualties, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA (Apr. 2006), http://www.eff.org/1P/DMCA/unintended_
consequences.php [hereinafter EFF, Unintended Consequences].
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Recent Development: Control of the Aftermarket
through Copyright, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 307 (2003) (criticizing Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003)).
88.
Lexmark Int7, 387 F.3d at 529.
89. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
90.

Id. at 1183.

91.
92.

Lexmarklnt'l, 387 F.3d at 553; Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1204.
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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media streamed on-line to be time-shifted. 93 In 2004, commercial manufacturers of DVD back-up
software were barred from distributing their
94
software to consumers.
In practice, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions transcend
the physical boundaries of the United States' borders. Although a Norwegian teenager created the code at issue in Reimerdes, the DMCA applied when the code was distributed in the United States. 95 Similarly,
Skylarov, the Russian programmer, was arrested as soon as he travelled
to the United States. 96 In another copyright-related example, an American judge forced icraveTV, a Canadian company retransmitting television via the web, to shut down by ordering it to block its signal from
reaching the United States.9 7 In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada has
noted several instances where American courts have held that United
States copyright laws can apply extra-territorially. 98 Popular circumvention tools will be caught by the DMCA when either the technology or its
creator enters the United States, demonstrating how broad the effects of
this legislation can be.
B. The Audio Home RecordingAct
In theory, the AHRA sets up a scheme not dramatically different
from Canada's private copying levy. Rights-holders are entitled to collect royalties from manufacturers of certain digital audio recording devices, who must incorporate specific technological measures to prevent
serial copying. As a corollary, the AHRA prohibits infringement suits in
respect of certain private copying activities. 99 In practice, however, the
levy scheme under the AHRA is much narrower than Canada's private
copying levy. There are important technological, historical, legal and
economic distinctions between these two schemes.
The AHRA arose out of uncertainty surrounding the introduction of
the digital audio tape (DAT), which some music industry stakeholders
saw as a highly disruptive technology. 0 0 Prior to the enactment of the
93.

RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *1 (W.D.

Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
94.
321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.

95.

Reimerdes, I llF.Supp. at311,316.

96.

EFF, Unintended Consequences,supra note 83.

97.
Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831, 1833 (W.D.
Pa. 2000).
98.
See Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass'n of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427,459-60.
99.

See Alex Allemann, Note, Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The Uncertain Status

of MP3 underRecording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79
TEx. L. REv. 189, 195-96 (2000); Christine C. Carlisle, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 335, 336, 338 (1994); Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 - Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 145, 174-75 (1992); McKuin, supra note 55, at 325-28.
100.
Saba Elkman & Andrew F. Christie, Regulating Private Copying of Musical Works:
Lessonsfrom the U.S. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 4 (The Intellectual Prop. Research Inst. of
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AHRA, there was debate about whether private copying constituted an
infringement of copyright or an allowable "fair use," and whether DAT
device manufacturers could consequently be held liable for contributory
infringement. 1 ' 1 In the famous Sony Betamax case, 10 2 the United States
Supreme Court held that recording television programs for later viewing
("time shifting") was a fair use of copyright-protected works, and therefore manufacturers of videocassette recorders could not be held liable for
contributing to the infringement of copyright. 10 3 Although it is arguable
that the same reasoning applies to the transfer of music from one device
or medium to another ("format shifting"), there are differences between
analogue video recording and digital audio recording, including1 the
ease
4
with which multiple perfect copies can be made and distributed. 0
Manufacturers of audio recording devices were reluctant to engage
in prolonged and expensive litigation to find out whether they would be
protected by the Betamax doctrine. Moreover, DAT manufacturers
needed the recording industry to support the new technology by distributing music in this format.105 Therefore, building on a series of negotiated
agreements, 10 6 both sides lobbied Congress to codify their private compromise solution.
The resulting AHRA reflected agreements between device manufacturers and the recording industry concerning royalty payments and technological safeguards against serial copying. It also conferred a right
upon consumers to make non-commercial audio home recordings, and
prevented manufacturers, distributors, and importers of digital audio recording devices10 7from being sued for facilitating the production of these
private copies.

In the AHRA, "digital audio recording device" is defined as:
[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of
Austl., Working Paper No. 12/04, 2004), available at http://www.ipria.org/publications/
workingpapers/2004/IPRIA WP 12.04.pdf.
101.
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2006).
102.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony
Betamax].
103.
Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 421.
104.
See Elkman & Christie, supranote 100, at 4 (citing Allemann, supra note 99, at 194).
105.
Id.at 5.
106.
The "Athens agreement," so-named for the city in which the meetings took place, ensured
that DAT manufacturers would equip all DAT recorders with Serial Copy Management System

(SCMS) thereby allowing unlimited copying from original sources and preventing serial copying,
but failed to provide music creators with any compensation for home copying. Id. at 10; McKuin,
supra note 55, at 322. The "Cahn agreement", named for the litigation that produced the settlement,

provided for a royalty scheme to address this shortcoming. See Elkman & Christie, supra note 100,
at 5-6. Notably absent from the parties' negotiated agreements was a consumer right to produce

audio home recordings in the first place. Without such a right, manufacturers, distributors, and
importers of digital audio recorders could not clearly escape legal liability.
107.

Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 8, 13-14.
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some other machine or device, the digital recording function of
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is
capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use..
108

To be caught by the AHRA, the device must be capable of producing a "digital audio copied recording." 10 9 That is defined in the AHRA
as "a reproduction.., of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission."110 A "digital musical recording" is a material object in which are fixed only sounds and things incidental to those
sounds. 11 Importantly, this latter definition
excludes objects "in which
'1 12
one or more computer programs are fixed."
The AHRA enabled the introduction of new technologies, such as
the DAT and the MiniDisc, into the marketplace, although perhaps after
too long a delay. Consumers have never adopted DAT en masse. Also,
the narrow definition of "digital audio recording device" ensured
that
3
courts limited the scheme's application to new technologies. 1

So, the AHRA has certainly not been a panacea on the issue of audio home recording in the United States. The American recording industry has not always been successful obtaining injunctive relief against
manufacturers of devices that are sometimes used to record digital audio.1 14 At the same time, manufacturers lack the certainty they would
like to introduce new technologies. Consumers are often caught in the
middle of these battles. Several recent and ongoing cases demonstrate the
point.
In Diamond Multimedia Systems,' 1 5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a computer is not a "digital audio recording device" as outlined in the AHRA, because its "primary purpose" is not to
produce digital audio copied recordings. 1 6 Further, computer hard
drives are excluded from the ambit of the AHRA since hard drives contain computer programs that are "not incidental to any sound files that
may be stored on the hard drive.""l l 7 In other words, computers fail the
"primary purpose" test and satisfy the "material object exception.' 1 18

108.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(3).
109.
See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001); Elkman &
Christie, supra note 100, at 11.
110.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1).
111.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(5)(A)(i).
112.
17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(5)(B)(ii).
113.
Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 13.
114.
See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
115.
DiamondMultimedia, 180 F.3d at 1072.
116.
Id.at 1078.
117. Id.at 1076.
118.
Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 12.
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Because portable MP3 players copy music from computers, they also do
not fall within AHRA.
Based on this reasoning most other multi-purpose convergence devices, such as mobile phones, handheld PDAs, flash cards and other removable digital memory, might also fall outside the scope of the AHRA.
The flexibility of the AHRA to deal with new technologies may, however, be tested in court again soon. The recording industry has recently
filed suit against manufacturers of devices capable of recording and replaying music transmitted by satellite. In Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
XMSatellite Radio' 19 it has been alleged that the defendants are liable for
direct, contributory and vicarious infringement of copyright. 20 Although
the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of the AHRA, the defendants have argued that the allegedly infringing device conforms to the
AHRA's definition of a 'digital audio recording device' thereby granting
XM and their subscribers "absolute immunity" from the plaintiffs. 121 On
the one hand, the devices at issue in the XM Satellite litigation are distinguishable from the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, the iPod, and
other devices because the former record "indirectly from a transmission"
not "directly from another digital musical recording. 1 22 Therefore,
unlike the issues in Diamond Multimedia, issues related to the fixation of
other sounds on computers are irrelevant. On the other hand, the AHRA
only provides a defense against actions based on the manufacture, importation or distribution of devices, or on the non-commercial use of such
devices by consumers. 23 Some of the claims in the XM Satellite are
based upon other allegedly infringing activities, such as delivering digital
phonorecords.124 Although the service of delivering content is closely
tied to the product being distributed, it remains to be seen how the relationship will be interpreted under the AHRA.
In Canada, the Copyright Board has tried to expand the levy in a
technology-neutral manner by including new media and devices ordinarily used for copying music. 25 However, given the Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal's ruling overturning the Copyright Board's levy on
iPods and similar devices and the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Diamond Multimedia dismissing a claim
with respect to the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, the Canadian and

119. Complaint, At. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio Inc., No. 06-CV-3733 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2006), availableat http://eff.org/IP/digitalradio/XM-complaint.pdf.
120. Id. at 15, 25, 27.
121.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06-CV-3733, 2006 WL 2429415 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2006).
122. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1).
123.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008.
124. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 115(a)(1), (b)(l)-(2), 501(a) (West 2006).
125. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 29-32.
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American positions are similar in some respects. 126 Unlike some European nations, neither Canada nor the United States levies many digital
devices. 1 27 There are, however, still some major differences between the
Canadian and American levy schemes.
The main difference is that the Canadian levy applies to media that
are "ordinarily used" for private copying while the American scheme
adopts a "primary purpose" test with an exception for objects used to
copy computer programs. 128 This means CD burners incorporated into
personal computers and, consequently, blank CDs are not levied in the
United States. Canada, on the other hand, imposes a levy on blank CDs
despite the fact that only one third of these media are used to copy music. 129

That is the reason that Canada's levy generated roughly $35 million
(Canadian) in 2005, and total revenues collected since 2000 equal about
$162 million (Canadian). 130 As explained above, a levy of equivalent
scope in the United States would have generated about $1 billion (U.S.),
factoring in currency conversions and extrapolating for population differences. 131 By comparison, between 1992 and 2001, the net revenues
from the levies collected under the relevant provisions of the United
States Copyright Act total a little over 32$17.9 million (U.S.) (an average
of under $2 million (U.S.) per annum).'
C. Exemption/Levy Proposals
Although the AHRA imposes only a very narrow levy, some American commentators have considered whether to expand the role of levies
to compensate creators of digital content. 133 The appropriate scope of
126.
Compare Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance,
[2004] 247 D.L.R. 193 at 234 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refised, [2005] 3 F.C.R. i, with
DiamondMultimedia 180 F.3d at 1081 (indicating that both courts viewed MP3 players, such as the
Apple iPod and the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, as devices that should not be subject to
restrictions).
127.
See Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at 13.
128.
See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 11; Diamond
Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
129.
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
130.
Canadian Private Copying Collective, supranotes 42-43.
131.
Statistics Canada, supra note 44; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
132.
See Exhibit Retailers-16, filed as evidence in Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying
2003-2004, supra note 5; WILLIAM W. FISHER 111, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT at 282 n. 10 (2004).
See generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
133.
653, 763-64 (2005); FISHER, supra note 132, at 7-8; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263,
269 (2002); S. J. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory Licence, at 11 (2003), http://www.serci.org/2003/liebowitz2.pdf; Jessica Litman, Sharing & Stealing,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV.
813, 855-58 (2001); Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies" Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 508, at 12 (2004),
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levies in the digital era is a hot topic for Canadian, 134 Australian 135 and
European 136 experts as well. The following section describes the gist of
some of the recent proposals.
Professor Netanel, for example, delineated a comprehensive model
that would permit private copying, remixes, adaptations, modifications,
and dissemination of all kinds of communicative expressions in both
digital and non-digital forms.' 137 To provide sufficient compensation to
creators, a levy would be imposed on a broad range of goods and services, the value of which is substantially enhanced by peer-to-peer file
sharing.1 38 Professor Ku also advocated for levies on the sale of internet
services and electronic equipment, but his model would apply to digital
cultural products only. 139 Professor Fisher proposed to allow various
uses of audio and video recordings in exchange for a system likely
funded through taxation of digital recording and storage devices. 140 Eckersley has similarly discussed the concept of a virtual market-a decentralized, software-mediated, publicly funded mechanism
to reward digital
14 1
authorship without restricting flows of information.
Although different in details, all of the aforementioned models are
based on the same underlying idea: broad dissemination of music, movies and/or other forms of entertainment should be encouraged and the
present copyright system is a hindrance. Therefore, a new system is
needed to generate financial incentives for creators. The solution is a
variant of compulsory licensing. However-and this is the key pointthe license fees are to be paid not by actual users of copyrighted content
but by third-party proxies, such as manufacturers of electronic hardware
and software or network providers and other intermediaries.
http://www.catoinstitute.org/pubs/pas/pa508.pdf; Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy
to Allow FreePeer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003).
134.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for
File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 72-73 (2004); John Davidson, Rethinking Private Copying
in the Digital Age: An Analysis of the CanadianApproach to Music (2001) (unpublished L.L.M.
thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law); Cathy Allison, The Challenges and Opportunitiesof
Online Music: Technology Measures, Business Models, Stakeholder Impact and Emerging Trends,
DEPARTMENT

OF

CANADIAN

HERITAGE

(2004),

http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-

ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/onlinemusic/online music e.pdf.
135. See, e.g., Peter Eckersley, Virtual Marketsfor Virtual Goods: The MirrorImage of Digital
Copyright?, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 106-11 (2004); Andrew F. Christie, Private Copying Li-

cence and Levy Schemes: Resolving the Paradox of Civilian and Common Law Approaches,
INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RESEARCH

INSTITUTE

OF

AUSTRALIA

1

(2004),

http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/Occasional %20paper/ 22.04.pdf;
Gaita & Christie, supra note 8, at 1-3; Kimberlee Weatherall, A Comment on the Copyright Exceptions Review and Private Copying 1, 20-21 (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia,
Working Paper No. 14/05, 2005), available at http://www.ipria.org/publications/workingpapers/
WP14.05.pdf.
136. See Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at ii.
137. Netanel, supra note 133, at 35.
138.

Id.

139.
140.
141.

See Ku, supra note 133, at 313, 321-22.
FISHER, supra note 132, at 202-03, 216-17.
Eckersley, supra note 135, at 92-93.
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It is important to distinguish these proposals from ostensibly similar
ideas discussed, for example, by Professor Gervais,142 the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF),143 and from emerging licensed p2p services.
Professor Litman noted that there are two models for collecting fees to be

distributed among creators: (1) a direct blanket licensing fee or (2) a tax
on the sale of goods or services.'4 Professor Gervais's model essentially
proposed p2p user-fees, which are simply brokered by intermediaries and

backed-up by enforceable exclusivity. 14 5 This type of scheme would be
voluntary rather than compulsory.146 Voluntary licensing proposals,
unlike exemption/levy schemes, are still built on a framework of exclusive proprietary copyrights. 47 Professor Gervais advocated for a system
whereby copyright is used to normatively coerce consumers into payment of licensing fees 48 but is in practice rarely or never actually litigated.149 Generally, Professor Gervais, like the EFF, proposed to build
new business models upon slight modifications to the existing paradigm. 150 These types of proposals are calls for more business reforms
rather than legal reforms.
Other scholars also believe that market responses to p2p and private
copying will eventually be found, so an expanded levy scheme is not the
way of the future.' 5' Professor Merges, for instance, has urged us to stick
with the three "golden oldies"-property rights, contracts, and markets.15 2 Likewise, Professor Leibowitz has emphasized that we should
not "throw out the baby with the bathwater" but should instead investigate more carefully
arguments surrounding a shift away from an unfet53
tered market.
54
Had the United States Supreme Court decided the Grokster case'
differently, it is conceivable that Congress would be considering a com142.
See generally Gervais, supra note 134, at 73 (discussing the idea of enforcing a voluntary
compulsory licensing scheme).
143.
See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing 1 (2004), http://www.eff.org/share/collective lic_wp.pdf [hereinafter EFF, A Better Way Forward] (discussing the idea of enforcing a voluntary compulsory licensing scheme).
144.
Litman, supra note 133, at 44.
145.
Gervais, supra note 134, at 73.
146.
See FISHER, supra note 132, at 46-52. Professor Fisher prefers a compulsory regime, but
would be willing to accept a voluntary scheme, outside of governmental control. Id.
147.
See EFF, A Better Way Forward,supra note 143 (discussing the benefits of voluntary
licensing proposals to copyright owners and how these copyright owners are able to maintain proprietary rights to their works under this model).
148.
See Gervais, supra note 134, at 56-58.
149.
See id. at 59.
150.
Compare Gervais, supra note 134, at 73, with EFF, A Better Way Forward,supra note
142, at 1-2 (suggesting alterations to the already existing p2p networks).
151.
See Merges, supra note 133, at 10.
152.
See id. at 5 ("Maintaining the traditional legal pairing of property rights and contracts,
which usually leads to market formation, seems like a safer course than mandates or new market
intervention to correct for past market intervention.").
153.
Liebowitz, supra note 133, at 20.
154.
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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pulsory licensing scheme right now. In fact, that is precisely what happened when the Supreme Court held that manufacturers of player piano
rolls were not liable to pay royalties to music composers. 55 As things
stand, dramatic changes of the sort proposed under Professor Netanel's
"Non-Commercial Use Levy," (NUL) or Professor Fisher's "Alternative
Compensation Scheme" (ACS) are unlikely.1 56 That does not mean,
however, that more moderate changes are out of the question. Although
there may be problems implementing the types of reforms advocated by
proponents of broader levy schemes, it would be unwise to dismiss outright the calls for change. Because of the strength of some of the arguments in favor of proposals for change, law and policy makers might be
persuaded to adopt some of these suggestions.
III. STAKEHOLDERS

North American law and policy makers seem right now to be standing at a crossroads with levies to the left and locks to the right. Canadians and Americans are approaching this crossroads from opposite directions. Canada already has a relatively broad levy (compared to the
United States), and is now considering introducing legal protections for
TPMs. 157 The United States already has anti-circumvention58provisions,
and there are now suggestions to adopt a broad levy system. 1
This section looks at the impact of locks and levies from the perspective of three main groups of stakeholders: creators, technology firms,
and consumers. Analysis reveals conflicting views about the appropriate
policy measures between and within these groups. The diversity of perspectives may lead to compromise solutions where aspects of multiple
proposals are implemented.
A. Creators
Different creators and distributors benefit differently from locks and
levies. Generally speaking, multinational movie studios, record labels,
and other large-scale producers would prefer to rely upon locks to control the distribution of digital content. Authors, performers and smallscale producers are not usually adverse to the idea of sacrificing some
control in exchange for the steady revenue streams provided by levies.
Conflicts within the music industry itself significantly complicate policy
debates surrounding these issues.
155.
156.

See White-Smith Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.

157.
House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act ch. 27,
(June 20, 2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemmentlC-60/C60_1/C-60_cover-E.html. (proposing penalties for the circumvention of TPMs).
158. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2006) (establishing
anti-circumvention provisions); FISHER, supra note 132, at 202 (proposing a tax-based reward system); Eckersley, supra note 135, at 92-93 (proposing a publicly-funded remuneration system);
Netanel, supra note 133, at 83 (proposing levies for non-commercial use).
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59
Major corporate rights-holders seem to prefer TPMs to levies.
TPMs offer greater control over consumers' use of digital content, and
therefore they facilitate new business models. 60 TPMs also help to facilitate price discrimination, which means charging different prices for
different products, or even better, different prices for the same product,
based upon a consumer's willingness to pay. This is an important profitmaximizing strategy.

Levies, on the other hand are perceived by this group as problematic
for several reasons. For one, they complicate international copyright
enforcement and licensing practices. 61 Also, although existing levy
schemes are intended to cover only truly private copying and not peer-topeer (p2p) file sharing, many consumers might get the impression that
levies legitimize and compensate for unlimited copying and sharing. As
mentioned, some judges have adopted this view, which proved to be
highly problematic when Canadian copyright-holders attempted to sue
users of p2p networks in Canada. 62 The major record labels are struggling to keep the issues of file sharing and private copying distinct from
each other. In fact, concerns of these sorts have led the Canadian Recording Industry Association president, Graham Henderson,
to argue that
63
Canada's private copying levy should be abolished. 1
However, many creators like levies. Individual authors, performers
and collecting societies, for example, often argue in favor of the continued use of levies to remunerate for consumers' non-commercial or private copying activities. 164 Levies can help offset some of the power imbalances that exist between artists and music companies because statutes,
regulations or administrative decisions may require equitable distribution
patterns.
Some creators feel that TPMs primarily benefit major corporate
producers by enhancing their already concentrated control over the distribution of digital content.1 65 Moreover, these groups reject digital locks
as "risky and counterproductive."' 166 Incidents like the one described
159.
Jorg Reinbothe, Private Copying, Levies and DRMs against the Background of the EU
Copyright Framework, Address at the DRM Levies Conference in Brussels (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/copyright/documents/2003-speech-reinbotheen.htm.
160.
Id.
161.
See Reinbothe, supra note 159.
162.
BMG Can. Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 18-19.
163.
Larry Leblanc, CRIA Calls for End of Blank-Media Levy, BILLBOARD 18, Apr. 8, 2006,
http://www.ccfda.ca/Downloadsresources/CRIA CCFDA Billboard.doc.
164.
Reinbothe, supra note 159. See, e.g., AEPO-ARTS, FIA and FIM Express Their Deep
Concern and Clear Opposition to any Restrictions of the Remuneration System for Private Copying,
Music BUSINESS, May 31, 2006, http://www.labellife.com/2006/05/31/aepo-artis-fia-and-fimexpress-their-deep-concem-and-clear-opposition-to-any-restrictions-of-the-remuneration-system-forprivate-copying.
165.
Press Release, Canadian Music Creators Coalition, Launch of a New Voice: The Canadian
Music Creators Coalition (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://www.musiccreators.ca/docs/
PressRelease-April_26.pdf.
166.
Id
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above involving Sony-BMG generate hostility toward the music industry
in general, not just those who employ TPMs. Some creators are therefore skeptical of anti-circumvention provisions. For example, a group of
high-profile Canadian artists including the Barenaked Ladies, Avril
Lavigne, Sarah McLachlan and others 1have
agreed that both artists and
67
consumers need protectionfrom TPMs.
Studies suggest that legal protection for digital locks seems to influence what sort of content is created and by whom, but not the amount of
content created. For example, a recent economic analysis of Canadian
copyright-based industries concluded that the Canadian music scene is
thriving.1 68 On the one hand, there was consolidation among the major
multinational record labels, and their record sales fell. 169 At the same
time, however, a number of mid-sized Canadian-based firms leveraged
their success in production and music publishing to establish a secure
footing in the Canadian marketplace.170 Despite the lack of specific anticircumvention provisions in Canadian law, the Canadian sound recording
industry experienced steady growth between 1999 and 2004.17 I The
GDP contribution consistently outperformed overall Canadian
GDP
72
while growing from $243 million to $387 million (Canadian).
To summarize, major producers and distributors tend to favor locks
over levies while many artists and their representatives in collective societies would prefer levies to deal with issues like private copying, and
perhaps even p2p file sharing.
B. Technology Firms
This group of stakeholders is also diverse. It includes manufacturers of media and devices related, in varying degrees, to the use of copyright-protected content. Such firms may produce blank analogue or digital audiotapes, CDs and digital memory, portable music and video devices, computer hardware and software, as well as other consumer electronic equipment. The group also includes retailers and other distributors
of these media and devices, who are often overlooked as stakeholders.
Internet service providers and other communications intermediaries may
fall within this group too, as they could be the targets of levies in the
future.

167.

Id.

168.

CONNECTUS CONSULTING INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CANADIAN

COPYRIGHT

INDUSTRIES-SECTORAL ANALYSIS 13 (2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/acca/progs/pda-cpb/pubscopyright/EconomiclmpactofCanadian e.pdf. The final report was submitted
to the Copyright Policy Branch, Department of Canadian Heritage. Id at 1.
169.
Id. at 75.
170.

Id.

171.
172.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77.
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Generally speaking, these firms argue against the imposition of levies on their products and services. 173 They claim that levy schemes put
the onus on innovative technology and communications enterprises to
subsidize the music industry. 174 One might argue this is justified on three
possible grounds: causation, enrichment or convenience. Manufacturers
and intermediaries would respond that profiting directly or indirectly
from private copying is not a sufficient reason to impose a levy on their
goods or services. Nor is simple convenience. It is much too simplistic
to suggest that suppliers of blank media or Internet connectivity, for example, cause private copying.
In fact, many firms that would be targeted by levies can make a
convincing argument that their obligation to provide remuneration to
music creators and distributors runs contrary to fundamental principles
established in cases like Grokster 175 and Sony Betamax17 6 in the United
States, and CCH v. LSUC177 and SOCAN v. CAIPi v8 in Canada.

Here, it is important to distinguish the legal situations in Canada
and the United States. It is often unclear whether, in the United States,
an electronics manufacturer can be held contributorily liable for consumers' copying activities. For example, although VCR manufacturers were
absolved of responsibility in the Sony Betamax case, the Court in Grokster was divided as to whether or not p2p networks had substantial noninfringing uses.

179

As explained above, the uncertainty in American law

was one of the key factors leading to the negotiated compromise embodied in the AHRA. In this respect, levies do offer a palpable benefit to
entities that might otherwise face legal liability, or at least uncertainty.
By contrast, in Canada, it is clearer that most targets of a levy would
not otherwise be held liable for consumers' copying. The Canadian
equivalent of the American doctrine of contributory liability is found
within the rules governing authorization of infringing activities. In the
United States, simply providing the means to facilitate or benefit from
copyright infringement is unobjectionable. To be held liable the alleged
authorizer must have a degree of knowledge of and control over the actions of actual copyright infringers 18 0 But, in Canada, there exists a rule
173.
Reinbothe, supra note 159.
174.
See Press Release, Canadian Coalition for Fair Digital Access, Hidden Levy on Recordable
Storage
Media
is "Obsolete"
and
Should be Repealed
(Nov. 4,
2003),
http://www.ccfda.ca/Downloads-resources/ccfda releaseNov4_eng.doc.pdf.
175.
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
176.
SonyCorp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony
Betamax].

177.
See CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 68 [hereinafter
CCH v. LSUC].
178.
See Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 467 [hereinafter SOCAN v. CAIP].
179.

Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783-84 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) with Grokster, 125 S.

Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
180.
See id. at 2782.
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that even if one could be said to authorize the copying or communication
of music, courts must presume that the authorization is only to act in
accordance with the law. 181 The general rule is that liability for authorization only exists where an entity explicitly or implicitly "sanctions,
countenances or approves" copyright infringement. 182 Unlike in the
United States, therefore, a levy in Canada offers little or no benefit in
terms of copyright immunity for firms that manufacture or distribute
electronics media or devices.
Communications intermediaries in both Canada and the United
States have little to gain in return for a levy. In both countries, there are
already "safe harbour" provisions that protect these entities from liability. In the United States, these rules are found in 17 U.S.C. § 512.183 In
Canada, a simpler but nonetheless
effective provision is found in §
84
1
Act.
Copyright
the
of
2.4(l)(b)
It might be suggested that third party targets of levies actually benefit from the existence of exemption/levy schemes. The argument that
legalizing private copying increases sales of copying hardware and software is difficult to refute or verify. 185 It assumes first that legalizing an
activity will make it more prevalent. Peer-to-peer activities, however,
may be influenced more by social than legal norms. 186 Second, it assumes that music copying and blank media are complementary, so that if
the cost of copying music (in terms of legal risk and/or social stigma)
declines, demand for blank media will rise. Third, it assumes that the
increased demand resulting from legalization will be sufficient to off-set
the decreased demand resulting from higher prices caused by a levy.
Notice the contradictory assumptions regarding elasticity of demand that
would be required to support this argument.
And furthermore, even if there were some financial benefit to these
third parties, levies entail a substantial administrative burden.' 87 Technology and communications firms are simply
not in the business of col88
lecting, accounting for and remitting levies.
Levies can also result in significant market distortions by encouraging grey or black markets for levied products. This is a serious concern

181.
182.
183.
184.

CCHv. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 39.
See CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 38; SOCAN v. CAIP, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 at 84-85.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2006).
See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42 (1985); SOCAN v. CAJP, [2004] 2 S.C.R. at

446.
185.
See, e.g., Can. Private Copying Collective v. Can. Storage Media Alliance, [2004] F.C.A.
424, 685-687; Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 38; see also
FISHER, supra note 132, at 4.
186.
Gervais, supra note 134, at 73.
187.
Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supranote 5, at 25, 56.

188.

See id.
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for all parties affected by Canada's existing private copying levy. 189 The
net effect of levies on providers of levied goods and services is unlikely
to be positive.
Of course, TPMs can also affect technology firms and intermediaries in various ways. For example, the AHRA includes obligations relating to both locks and levies in the context of digital audio recording devices and media.' 90 Not only are digital audio recording devices and
media manufacturers required to pay royalties, they must design their
products to include Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) copycontrols. 191 Another example of the effect of TPMs on consumer electronics manufacturers was the proposed "broadcast flag." Under this
proposal, device manufacturers would have been obligated to make their
products compliant with a standard digital rights management (DRM)
system designed to control consumers' copying behaviour. 192 Initiatives
such as these are usually unpopular. Like levies, they impose additional
administrative, design, manufacturing and other unnecessary costs on
equipment manufacturers.
Nevertheless, manufacturers and providers of consumer goods and
services generally object to the idea of levies. These firms would typically prefer that content creators and distributors utilize TPMs.
C. Consumers
Just as different sorts of creators and copyright owners, as well as
electronics firms and communications intermediaries, may have different
preferences regarding locks and levies, consumers' reactions to these
issues are likely to be mixed. To understand the attitudes of the general
population toward locks and levies, it is necessary to differentiate between consumers of entertainment and consumers of electronics.
Many entertainment consumers, especially consumers of popular
music and films, are also electronics consumers who buy products such
as iPods and blank CDs. The inverse is also true for some electronics
consumers. For example, iPod consumers are also music consumers.
However, other types of electronics consumers may not be entertainment
189.
Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 58; Copyright Bd. of
Can., Private Copying2003-2004, supra note 5, at 24-25.
190.
See McKuin, supra note 55, at 325-26.
191.
Id. at 325.
192.
See Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), http://www.eff.org/IP/broadcastflag/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2006). A broadcast flag is a digital lock placed on digital media that prevents its
unauthorized reproduction by consumers using recording devices like VCRs, TiVo, DVD recorders,
mp3, satellite radio, and the like. Essentially, the broadcast flag places control over copyrighted
works and devices used to record those works in the hands of Hollywood. Unless Hollywood approves the device, consumers will be unable to make legitimate copies of flagged materials. EFF
See id. at
offers a brief video highlighting the dangers posed by the broadcast flag.
http://www.eff.org/corrupt/ (follow Corruptibles video link) (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
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consumers. Many consumers purchase blank media for data storage or
digital photography. Many consumers use computers and the Internet for
research, finance, communication or a long list of things other than entertainment. Furthermore, many purchasers of blank media, computers and
Internet access are not consumers at all but businesses, governments and
other institutions. Again, diversity within consumers as a group makes it
difficult to implement universal policies on locks and levies.
Proponents of digital locks might argue that TPMs and anticircumvention provisions can offer entertainment consumers more
choices for enjoying existing products and, eventually, more products to
choose from. 19 3 The reasoning is that creators and distributors can earn
greater profits if they are able to more precisely control the market for
their products. Greater profitability increases the motivation to create
and willingness to disseminate entertainment products. Not only is this
good for creators and distributors, whose profits increase, but, it might be
argued, this is also good for consumers, who can choose to enjoy the
products created. Also, with TPMs, the market could determine prices
that enable more consumers to purchase entertainment products,
and
1 94
possible.
traditionally
was
than
efficiently
more
so
do
could
Digital locks do have a downside for entertainment and electronics
consumers. For one, consumers must tolerate some inconveniences, such
as interoperability issues. Sometimes, digital locks present security or
privacy issues. The Sony BMG "rootkit" incident was a vivid reminder
of the dangers associated with TPMs. 195 Interoperability, security and
privacy concerns are clearly matters to be taken seriously, but they are
also ones that presumably 96can and should be addressed with adequate
consumer protection laws.
Some critics of digital locks would argue that they do not increase
but rather decrease the breadth of content from which consumers may
choose. 97 This is because they help to concentrate control over the production of cultural goods and services among a small group of large enterprises. Competition laws may be not be effective to address this issue.
The more problematic aspect of digital locks, however, is the effect
they can have on semiotic democracy1 98 and a participatory, free cul-

193.
See, e.g., Barry B. Sookman, "TPMs ": A Perfect Storm for Consumers: Replies to Professor Geist, 4 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 23, 29-31 (2005); Michael A. Einhorn, Commentary, Canadian
Quandary: Digital Rights Management, Access Protection,and Free Markets, Progresson Point 13,
THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION (2006) at 5, available at http://www.pff.orgissuespubs/pops/pop 13.12can_quan.pdf.
194.
See FISHER, supra note 132, at 163-69.
195.
See deBeer, supra note 60, at 95-99.
196. See id. at 5-6, 95-97.
197.
See Sookman, supra note 193, at 31.
198.
See FISHER, supra note 132, at 270 (tracing the origin of this phrase to John Fiske).
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ture.' 99 As Professor Fisher describes it, this is "the ability of 'consumers' to re-shape cultural artifacts and ...

to participate more actively in

the creation of the cloud of cultural meanings through which they
move.'2°° Therefore, for many consumers who are proponents of
levy/exemption schemes, the attractiveness lies mainly in the exemption
aspect of the quidpro quo.
The value of such an exemption, however, depends greatly on its
scope. To American consumers, a levy that covers only truly private
copying-something just like Canada's private copying levy-would
offer few if any benefits. Time or format shifting, archiving backups and
personalizing compilations are all likely examples of "fair use" in the
United States. 20 1 Even for Canadians, the value of an exemption for private copying is questionable. A decade ago, when Canada's private
copying levy was being considered, the weight of opinion at that time
was that distinctions between the American concept of "fair use" and the
Canadian law of "fair dealing" meant private copying was clearly illegal
in Canada.20 2 Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a
series of landmark decisions about balance in copyright law.203 A credible argument can now be made that some private non-commercial uses
of music are "fair dealing" for the purposes of research or private
study. 2°4 This would render the private copying exemption in section 80
of the Copyright Act redundant in some cases, 20 5 and call into question
the value of a broader exemption/levy scheme for consumers.
On the other hand, a broader levy that covers not just private copying, but also p2p file sharing, would offer some palpable benefits to entertainment consumers. The trouble is that such an exemption would be
nearly impossible to obtain in practice. For an exemption/levy scheme to
succeed, fundamental and wholesale changes in the existing copyright
system would be necessary.
199.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).

200.

See FISHER, supra note 132, at 28-31, 184.

201.

See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (Mat-

thew Bender 1997) (1963); Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 432-33; Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at
1079.
202.
Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2001, supra note 5, at 59.
203.
SOCAN v. CAIP, [2004] 2 S.C.R.at 448-49; CCH, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 23-24; Thrberge v.
Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 355-56.

204.
In CCH, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed that systematic for-profit legal
research carried out by tens of thousands of Ontario lawyers is fair dealing. CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1
S.C.R. at 88-90. An individual's downloading activities for the purpose of consumer research, to
evaluate a potential music purchase for example, would seem far less objectionable than that. Id.
205.
The Supreme Court held that reference to specific exemptions is unnecessary if an activity
falls within the more general fair dealing provisions. See CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 48-49.
The Copyright Board, in contrast, held that the section 80 exemption for private copying relegates
the general fair dealing exemption to a second-order enquiry. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private
Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 20-21. At worst, therefore, if the section 80 exemption does not

apply (because, for example, the medium is not an "audio recording medium"), the fair dealing
provisions may be engaged.
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Even then, not all consumers would be pleased with a
levy/exemption scheme. Although there would be significant benefits to
entertainment consumers, we must be careful to distinguish consumers of
electronics and communications services. In Canada, the Federal Court
of Appeal has acknowledged: "Such a scheme cannot be perfect; it is a
rough estimate, involving possible overcharging of some and undercharging of others. '' 20 6 Although some users of the product or service in
question-blank media, electronics devices, personal computers or Internet access-will engage in the copying or communication activities at
the root of the scheme, a great number of others will not.
Some suggest that concerns about cross-subsidization are overblown. 20 7 But take the following concrete example: All blank CDs
manufactured in or imported to Canada are subject to a levy to compensate for the fact that some blank CDs are used for copying music. 20 8 The
Copyright Board found that "80 [to] 90 percent of individual consumers
who buy blank CDs do so in some measure for the specific purpose of
copying pre-recorded music. Moreover, it appears that over 40 percent
of individuals use recordable CDs for no other purpose.', 20 9 However,
the highest estimates suggest that of all blank CDs bought in Canada, the
proportion of blank CDs used by consumers to copy music (as compared
to those used by businesses, or for copying data or photographs, for example) is roughly one third.210 The levy rate is discounted to reflect this
fact, but the point remains that purchasers of two thirds of all blank CDs
subsidize the few consumers who use these media heavily for copying
music. Simply put, the levy has a much larger effect on persons who do
not engage in private copying than on persons who do.
The over-breadth of Canada's private copying levy is more than just
an unfortunate side effect for consumer technophiles. It is a very serious
issue for thousands of Canadian manufacturers, retailers and commercial
purchasers of goods and services that are or would be levied. Imagine
the effect that a levy on Internet access would have on e-commerce or
educational uses of the Web. It would be inconsistent with a policy of
reducing internet access costs to increase broadband penetration.
If a levy were imposed on digital memory generally, without
amending the meaning of "ordinarily" as interpreted by the Copyright
Board, the same problem could easily arise with respect to memory
206.
Canada's private copying regime was described as such by the Federal Court of Appeal.
AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 68, 7
(2000) [hereinafter A VS Technologies].
207.
Netanel, supra note 133, at 67-74.
208. Copyright Bd. of Can., PrivateCopying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 15, 22.
209. Id. at 14.
210.
Id. The data is insanely confusing, because there are different proportions to consider
(including "consumer vs. business purchasers" and within that "music vs. non-music uses") and
different statistics for different formats, not to mention conflicting evidence on the accuracy of
different figures submitted by different parties.
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cards, personal computers, mobile telephones, personal digital assistants
or a range of other digital devices. Remember, even the iPod is also a
personal agenda, portable data storage device, digital photo album, video
player and, perhaps soon, a mobile phone. There is no way to distinguish
customers who fill these devices with music from those who do other
things. As technological advances lead to increasing product convergence, this problem will only be exacerbated.
The perceived unfairness might be alleviated through carefully tailored exceptions, which can, in theory, turn levies from blunt instruments
into precise tools. However, separating the wheat from the chaff is not
easy. If Canada's current private copying regime is any indication,
things do not bode well for broader levy. The Federal Court of Appeal,
affirming the Copyright Board of Canada on this point, recently noted
that Part VIII of the Copyright Act contains no legitimate exemptions for
the vast numbers of consumers and businesses who purchase blank media for purposes other than private copying. 211 The Court agreed with the
Board's insights that there are fundamental problems with the ad hoc
waiver program that has developed, which is administered unilaterally by
the beneficiaries of the levy.2t2
When Canada's levy was first introduced, business and institutional
purchasers of blank media, including churches, educators and broadcasters, were upset at the prospect of having to pay substantial levies.21 3 To
defray possible legal challenges to the scheme from these groups, the
Canadian Private Copying Collective (CPCC) created an ad hoc scheme
where it would consider applications from some purchasers to be "zerorated., 21 4 In other words, if a purchaser agrees to certain restrictions, as
well as auditing provisions, the CPCC might be willing to waive its right
to collect levies from that purchaser. The program is only open to businesses or institutions, not individual consumers.1 5 Even for the former,
media must be purchased only from authorized distributors, not through
ordinary retailers, which has created significant distortions in the chain
of distribution for blank media.21 6 So far, the private program has not
been subjected to any supervision by the courts or the Copyright Board
to ensure it is administered fairly and equitably.
In sum, it might be true that some consumers of entertainment
products would benefit from DRM systems, if the result is more content
and greater choice. Many however, are rightly more concerned about
matters such as security, privacy, interoperability, convenience and the
concentration of control over production. For these consumers, levies
211.
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represent a preferable alternative. However, many purchasers of multifunctional electronics devices or communications services would prefer
not to pay levies on account of entertainment products which they never
or seldom consume.
IV. COMPROMISES

It is evident that various stakeholders have diverging views on locks
and levies. There is even considerable disagreement within stereotypical
"groups" of stakeholders, such as "creators" or "consumers." Because of
the diversity of perspectives no stakeholder is likely to see his/her ideal
solution implemented. The polycentric nature of these issues requires
trade-offs and compromises.
In fact, Professor Netanel characterizes his Non-Commercial Use
Levy (NUL) as a middle ground between "digital lock-up" and "digital
abandon. 21 7 Similarly, Eckersley proposes a virtual market between
"information feudalism" and "information anarchism." 21 8 Professor
Fisher suggests his Alternative Compensation Scheme (ACS) as a fair
alternative to full propertization or other forms of regulation. 21 9 Proposals by Ku, Lunney, Litman and others could also be described as compromise solutions.
I would predict, however, that if lawmakers were to give serious
consideration to these alternatives, the middle ground would not be these
proposals themselves, but a point between these proposals and a scenario
even more favorable to major content producers than the status quo.
Professor Litman is, in my opinion, absolutely correct in stating:
As consensus builds around the idea of paid peer-to-peer, it seems increasingly plausible that some legislation will emerge with enough
support from the music, recording, computer, and consumer electronic industries to have a fair chance of enactment. I expect that that
legislation will include both consumer downloads of music and collective licenses to pay for them. Such a bill is less likely to resemble
the proposals advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Lunney, Ku, Gervais, or
Lessig, however, than it is to be designed to maintain the current recording220and music industry distributors in their market dominant position.
Historical trends support this impression.22 ' Often, the pressures of
multiparty negotiations yielded rights for one group at the expense of
another. 2 However, many times congressional pressure has prompted a
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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flurry of compromises between the parties at the bargaining table, generating a law with something for everyone.2 23
Professor Netanel suggests that TPMs are incompatible with his
NUL.224 He states that digital content providers would not be permitted
to use DRM systems or otherwise sabotage peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing networks. 225 At least, he argues, consumers would have to be permitted to circumvent TPMs and circulate the tools needed to do so. 22 6 Eckersley's "virtual market" and Ku's "Digital Recording Act" alternatives
are seemingly envisioned as 227
a complete replacement for DRM systems,
not a complementary option.
But because of the tremendous difficulties of getting industry incumbents to embrace proposals for radical change, some proponents of
broader levy schemes in the United States recognize the possible need to
allow individual rights-holders to choose either locks or a levy. Under
Professor Fisher's proposal, rights-holders would be free to opt-out of an
alternative compensation scheme, and instead continue to distribute
copyright-protected content and enforce their exclusive copyrights.2 28
Those particular copyrights-holders would, of course, be ineligible to
receive revenues generated under the alternative scheme. Presumably,
aggregate levy rates may be reduced accordingly, and consumers' rights
might depend on whether the work was included within the scheme or
not. Professor Lessig likewise contemplates an alternative scheme complementing the existing system.2 2 9 He specifically mentions how Professor Fisher's plan need not interfere with innovative businesses like Apple's iTunes Music Store. 230 As long as there are few limitations on what
one is allowed to do with the content, he suggests that these alternatives
can co-exist. 1 Similarly, Professor Lunney suggests that private copying could be addressed through a combination of weak encryption technologies, an honors system and a limited tax on copying devices and
storage media.232 Professor Litman also contemplates the simultaneous
use of locks and levies. She would allow rights-holders to use TPMs to
restrict access and copying, but would require that such files be uniformly identified, for example by a ".drm" extension. 3
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Professor Yu notes that because different models have both benefits
and limitations, "[t]he best system for policymakers to adopt may therefore involve a combination of these proposals. 2 34 He also notes that
"the industry must be prepared to migrate from one regime to another,2 or
35
even to adjust to living with many different regimes at the same time.
No doubt it is correct that the best solution might be a hybrid of
various possibilities. After all, copyright law already contains a mix of
different rules providing for exclusive rights, protections for TPMs,
compulsory and voluntary collective licensing regimes and levy
schemes. The applicable framework may depend on the type of work at
issue, for example a literary work or a sound recording, or the particular
use being regulated such as a public performance or private copying.
However, the number of different copyright rules is one thing that
makes the present copyright system so problematic. Canada already has
too many copyright collectives.23 6 In the United States (and elsewhere) it
is extraordinarily difficult to understand, let alone navigate, the rightsclearance process for making music available online.237 This overwhelming complexity stifles innovation. It is economically inefficient.
Indeed, it is one of the reasons scholars have called for a new model.
While some in the United States have called for the phasing in of
levies as an alternative to locks, valuable lessons can be learned from
European and Canadian attempts to phase them out. There is a real danger that alternative compensation schemes will in practice become additional compensation schemes. This leads to a troubling problem of double-billing consumers.
Consumers can easily find themselves caught in the middle of a
copyright regime that prohibits the circumvention of DRM systems in
order to access or copy digital content, but at the same time mandates
levy payments to compensate for copying that either cannot occur or is
already licensed. Consumers can pay for the same activity two or even
three times over. For example, someone who purchases a song from
Apple's iTunes Music Store contractually acquires the right to make certain private copies of the track. They are expressly entitled to "burn" and
"export" tracks "for personal, non-commercial use. 238 Even aside from
these contractual terms, this activity may be fair use or fair dealing. Yet
this consumer would pay for the same activity through a TPM-enforced
234.
235.
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license and through a private copying levy. Furthermore, there is a danger this consumer could still infringe copyright laws by engaging in certain ancillary activities. We've seen from the Canadian experience that
this can be a problem even if the levy is ostensibly technology-neutral.
Double-dipping in this manner is likely to cause resentment
amongst consumers. This may ultimately jeopardize the viability of the
levy scheme. Consumer hostility toward industry tactics could also undermine the implementation of creative new business models. In other
words, locks and levies undermine each other.
The European Community's Copyright Directive tries to have it
both ways-simultaneously encouraging the adoption of DRM systems
and levy schemes to deal with private copying. The Copyright Directive
expressly references the need for levies to take "account of the application or non-application of technological measures., 239 The Copyright
Directive, however, contains few clues as to how exactly member states
are to implement this instruction.
A team of experts led by Professor Bernt Hugenholtz has studied
this aspect of the Copyright Directive closely.240 They concluded that it
would be most appropriate to phase out levies as TPMs become available, as opposed to actually applied. 24 1 The availability of TPMs would
be based upon an assessment of whether they can be both realistically
and legally applied in the marketplace.
However, despite the fact that TPMs are prevalent in the marketplace-take most online music stores for example-no member state has
yet taken account of this. Although music sold through Apple's iTunes
Store is protected with the FairPlay DRM system, many European countries nevertheless impose a levy on iPods.24 2 Likewise, the levies on
blank media such as CDs have been calculated without regard to the extent to which TPMs either license private copying or make it impossible.
A similar situation nearly materialized in Canada, without study or
any public consultation on the issue. As explained above, in 2005 the
Government of Canada tabled Bill C-60, which would have put specific
anti-circumvention provisions into Canadian copyright law.243 Recall
that Bill C-60 would have prohibited circumvention only for the purposes
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of infringing copyright. 244 Recall also that, under Canadian law, private
copying of sound recordings is not an infringement.2 45 One might think,
therefore, that circumventing TPMs for the purpose of private copying
would have been permitted.
But Bill C-60 would have allowed circumvention for all noninfringing purposes except private copying under section 80.246 This
reservation-that one cannot circumvent to copy for private use-was
somewhat mysterious. It would have prohibited consumers from making
private copies even though they paid for the right to do so through the
levy. In effect, this would have allowed the music industry to be remunerated for copies that individuals cannot make or have already paid for.
The only possible explanation is that the government was depending
on the Copyright Board to factor this into consideration when setting the
levy rate. Unfortunately, given the lack of consultation or explanation,
we can only speculate as to the Canadian Government's intention. Although Europe's Copyright Directive has its problems, at least it contains
some direction on this issue.247
Prior to Bill C-60, the Copyright Board of Canada had, in fact,
demonstrated its own intention to phase out Canada's existing private
copying levy.24 8 The formula adopted by the Board for setting the levy
rate contains a calculation recognizing that technological measures allow
some consumers to pay directly for private copying rights. 249 As the
practice of using TPMs becomes more widespread, the Board may be
willing to reduce levy rates accordingly, perhaps eventually approaching
zero. To be clear, however, there is no guarantee that this will happen.
Furthermore, unlike the Copyright Directive, the Board's calculation only takes account of the extent to which TPMs are actually used,
not merely available. Hugenholtz and his team predicted that this undertaking "will prove to be a fruitless and frustrating exercise, in view of the
non-linear relationship between content, technical protection measure,
media, equipment and levy, and absent any baseline to measure the 'degree of use' against it."'250 According to them, it would have been better

244.
Parliament of Canada, Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act § 27, (June 20,
2005),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-60/C-60_l/C-60cover-E.html.
245.
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 80.
246.
Can. H. Commons Bill C-60 at § 27. It would have been permissible to circumvent TPMs
to exercise private copying rights granted by other sections of the Act, such as the fair dealing provi-

sions in section 29.
247.
Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at ii.
248.
House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-60 An Act to amend the Copyright Act § 27, (June
20, 2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-60/C-60_1/C-

60_cover-E.html.
249.
250.

Copyright Bd. of Can., PrivateCopying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 62.
Hugenholtz et al., supra note 8, at iv.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

to adopt "a more sensible and workable interpretation, which is inspired
by economical and practical considerations. 2 5'
In general it seems as if the Government, through Bill C-60, and the
Copyright Board, in its recent decisions, have created a hierarchy
whereby protection for technological measures is more important than
the conceptual or practical integrity of the private copying scheme. In
doing so, Canadian policy makers have apparently expressed a preference for technological measures over private copying levies as a solution
to some of the problems of the digital music market.
The compromises concerning locks and levies struck under the
European Copyright Directive are unfortunately typical in an era of
copyright compromises. The failure of the Canadian Government to
engage in a coordinated study of the relationship between locks and levies is also symptomatic of attempts to broker deals on particular issues.
There is a risk that American lawmakers attempting to implement law
reform proposals to deal with private copying and p2p will fall into a
similar trap. Simultaneously using locks and levies to address these issues most seriously affects consumers, who can easily find themselves
paying levies to compensate for copying that either cannot occur, is already licensed or is or ought to be fair use/dealing. Policymakers should
be aware of this concern in order to minimize inconsistencies and incompatibilities when responding to the challenges of private copying and
p2p.
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